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THE GREEK MILITARY REGIME (1967-1974) AND THE CYPRUS
QUESTION -- ORIGINS AND GOALS*
CONSTANTINE P. DANOPOULOS
Ball State University
Journal of Political and Military Sociology 1982, VoL 10 (Fall):257-273

This article employs the concept of military professionalism and its
attributes to explain the Greek praetorian regime's handling of the
Cyrprus problem. Upon examining the relevant data it was found that for
strategic considerations the U.S. and NATO sought to achieve a
negotiated solution to the Cyprus problem which would have amounted
to double Enosis. It was also found that professional needs created a
dependency of the Greek military on NATO for arms, sophisticated
training, and support which let them view participation in NATO as
indespensab/e. As a result, the Greek military confused the interests of
their nation with those of the Atlantic Alliance and sought to solve the
Cyprus problem on the basis of NATO's interests even though such a
solution went contrary to the national aspirations of Greece.
Military professionalism 1 is considered by most students of contemporary
civil-military relations as the most salient characteristic of modern military
organizations. As such, a proliferatin~~ number of studies dealing with nations
that have experienced praetorianism employ the concept of professionalism as
a key variable affecting the behavior of the armed forces with respect to
intervention and subsequent military rule. Other scholarly works deal with
professionalism's impact on a host of other related concerns including the
armed forces' ideological persuasions, organizational structure, and attitude
toward human nature and politics.
This intense scholar~1attentir,m displayed tmvard these concerns, however,
cannot be matched with a general neglect of the impact of "bloc" or alliance
oriented professionalism on the f0reign policy attitudes of the military of state
members of such defense alliC~nces as NATO, ANZUS, and OAS. Bengt
Abrahamsson pr6vides some thepretical support for this. He argues that the
military perceive t11eml)elves as the sole guarantors of the physical, political, and
moral integrity of their na.tion. But in order to be able to accomplish this mission
* This paper is a much revised and condensed veJ;slon of chppter five of the author's doctoral
dissertation titled "Soldiers in Politics: The Case of Contemporary Greece", University of Missouri
Columbia, 1980.
1 This paper uses Abral~amsson's (1972) ddiniti.ol~ O•f military professkmalism, which includes
(a) spedalizled thE~oreticall~nowledge ,ac:companied b~• methods and devices for application; (b)
respoi~sibilit;,~, groupded on a set oi ethical rules; and (c') a high degr.ee of corporateness deriving
from ,common training and devotion t.:) sp~Jcifi~ dactrh1.e$. and customs. See his Military
Professionalism and Political Power (Beverly Hills: Sa.ge Publications), p. 15.
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military organizations need arms, equipment, sophisticated training, and
support which, for the most part, can only be provided by a relatively small
number of developed states most of whom belong in such alliances. Thus,
dependency for such essentials and concern for the security of their client, the
state, (and by implication the professional interests of the military organization)
prompt officers to view participation and adherence to the basic principles of a
"common bloc" as "positive" and even indispensable for they strengthen "the
position of each individual country against the common adversary." As such,
they are considered "perfectly compatible" with the military's nationalistic
attitudes. In short, concern for the security of the state, Abrahamsson
concludes, " ...is tranformed into favorable opinion of the defense community"
(1972:83).
The purpose of this paper is to determine whether alliance-oriented military
professionalism and its attributes impact on the armed forces' foreign policy
attitudes. This is to be accomplished by looking at the Colonels' -as the Greek
military rulers became known - handling of the Cyprus Question which
culminated in the overthrow of Archbishop Makarios in July 1974. The following
pages will trace the historical components of the Cyprus problem leading up to
the establishment of the Cypriot Republic in 1960; examine the developments
occuring from the constitutional crisis of 1962 up to the 1967 coup-d'-etat,
unfold the praetorian regime's Cyprus policy, and analyze the nature of that
policy and assess the impact of Greece's membership in NATO on it. 2

A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW UNTIL 1967
"The central fact of nation-building," says Reinhard Bendix, "is the orderly
exercise of a nationwide public authority" which presupposes "agreement
c~cerning the rules that are to govern the resolution of conflict" (1964:18-22).
The island of Cyprus inhabited by about 80 percent Greek-Cypriots and about
18 percent Turkish-Cypriots clearly does not fall in this category. The Greek
Cypriots trace their Greekness as far back as the fourth-century B.C. The
introduction of Christianity fastened this link and established a pervasive
Church role in every aspect of Greek-Cypriot life. The Moslem Turkish
Cypriots, meanwhile, view themselves as descendents of the Ottomans who
occupied the island from 1573 to 1878 and see the modern state of Turkey as
their mother country. But the barrier of religion kept the two communities apart
and prevented the emergence of. a national Cypriot consciousness. This was
also enhanced by the geographic location which rendered Cyprus an important
2 This paper is partly based on a suvvey questionnaire consisting of thirty-one close-ended
questions administered during the month of tvlay 198) to thirty-four offic~rs of the Greek Armed
Forces on postgraduate training at the N<~val Postgraduate School in Monterey, C<!lifornia. Of the
thirty-four officers or:ily eighteen bothered to return the questionnaire by mail as the author had
requested.
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refueling station for those who competed in this sensitive part of the world. The
British, by virture of a temporary agreement with the Ottomans, were the last to
gain the right to administer the island. The Treaty of Lausanne (1923) formally
added Cyprus to Her Majesty's colonial empire.
However, the tides of anticolonialism that swept the world in the years
following World War II touched the more economically and politically
developed Greek-Cypriots. Led by the Church and the National Organization
of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA}, they struggled for self-determination and Enosis
(union with Greece). Citing strategic considerations, Britain initially sought to
frustrate Greek-Cypriot airns by stimulating Turkish concerns regarding the
fate of their copatriots on the island. Ankara began advocating T akshim
(partition) as the only just solution and looked toward the U.S. and NATO for
support. The Western Alliance responded advocating a solution to the Cyprus
problem within the confines of NATO. Since NATO's military strategy is
nothing more than "an extension of American strategy" made possible through
"the massive infusion of American personnel, technology, and capital"
(Fedder ,1973: 12.5), the U.S.'s posture on th(: Cyprus matter became the official
policy of the Atlantic Alliance as well--an ar~Jument strongly echoed in the
Greek press (Carmocolias, 1981:229).
After considerable pressure from the U.S. and elsewhere (T erlexis,
1971:335), Greece joined Britain and Turkey in an effort to negotiate a solution
to the Cvprus dispute. [n February 1959, it was announced in Zurich that a
settlement was reached which the three "Guarantors" signed in London the
following August Conspicuously absent from the negotiation were the
representatives of the two Cypriot communities who after initial hesitation
signed the accord.
Briefly, the settlement consisted of three treaties and a draft constitution.
The treaties established the island as a sovereign state, forbade either Enosis or
partition, set out the terms of a military presence of both Greece and Turkey,
and contained a provision whereby the three powers guaranteed the
independence of the island. The constitutional structure established a
biocommunal structure in aJI levels of government and life. The executive
consisted of a Greek President and a Turkish Vice President elected separately
by E~ach community, each of whom had veto power in matters of security and
foreign affairs. En accordance with the s~ttlement the island became a republic in
Au!;iust 1960, with Makarios as President and Fazil Kuchuk as Vice President.
The imposed settlement ran iinto difficulties. The nature of the
constitutional structure along with the mistrust each comrnunity harbored
toward the diff!Brences in the level of economic development stalemated the
central government. On November 3, 196B, President Makarios sought to
break the impasse. He submitted a ~'thitteen point" plan aimed at amending key
sections of the constitution, but the Turkish side rejected it. The dismissal of the
plan shattered the uneasy cakn that prevailed on the island for the past three
years, and rumors of an imminent Turkish invasion spread. Meanwhile Vice
President Kuchuk and the three Turkish C51priot ministers resigned in protest,
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leading to a virtual isolation of their community that lasted until July 1974.
Fearing that the tense situation in Cyprus could quickly spread to a wider
conflict involving Greece and Turkey, the U.S. applied pressure to have a
NATO-sponsored peace-keeping force restore order. President Makarios,
however, rejected the idea, thus leaving the U.N. Security Council adopted a
resolution recommending that a U.N. peace-keeping force be sent to restore
the peace. The Cypriot Government consented and a force of 7,000 men
(UNFICYP) has been stationed on the island ever since. Under UNFICYP
auspices a semblance of peace was restored, but the schism between the two
communities widened and return to the London-Zurich framework became
highly problematic (Coufoudakis, 1976b). In Athens the new Centrist
government of George Papandreou appeared more sympathetic to the
Archbishop's view than did its predecessor, and it secretly strengthened the
Greek contingent on the island. Makarios sought and received Moscow's
support. Thus, Makarios' and Papandreous' "common line" of opposing
bilateral negotiations and seeking a U.S. solution won some badly needed
support.
Washington, however, had very little patience with a U.N. approach and
even less sympathy for Makarios' independent foreign policy positions.
President Johnson applied pressure on Greece and Turkey to solve the Cyprus
problem through bilateral negotiations and in July 1964 invited the Prime
Ministers of the two countries for separate consultations. The Turkish leader
offered no basic objections, but Papandreou, in spite of Johnson's arm twisting,
refused to abandon the U.N. road. To help mediate the impasse, the American
president summoned former Secretary of State Dean Acheson who presented
what became known as the "Acheson Plan". Basically, the scheme called for
Enosis of Cyprus with Greece, but in return Turkey was to receive the small
Aegean island of Kastellorizon and maintain a military base and two Turkish
cantons on the island. In effect, the Acheson Plan amounted to partition or, one
may say, double-Enosis. Ankara seemed favorably disposed toward the plan
but Makarios denounced it as totally unacceptable. Papandreou at first
accepted the plan but later, succumbing to pressure .from his son Andreas and
Archbishop Makarios, rejected it.
The new goyernment of Stephanos Stephanopoulos that replaced
Papandreou's seemed more amenable to the Acheson Plan and appeared
willing to proceed with bilateral negotiations. To counterbalance Makarios'
influence, Stephanopoulos appointed General George Grivas, the former
EOKA leader, as cornmander of the Greek forces stationed on the island.
Grivas attacked Makarios' stand and proclaimed himself the champion of
Enosis while keeping secret an agreement with Undersecretary of State George
Ball in which he had consented to accept the basic thrusts of the Acheson Plan
(Coufoudakis, 1976:283). Makarios protested and characterized Grivas'
appointment "a great error" (Katsis, 1976:8). This prompted the resignation of
Foreign Minister Tsirimokos. However, his successor met his Turki$h
counterpart in December 1966 and signed a protocol agreeing "to seek ways
which would facilitate the solution of the Cyprus problem within the general
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framework of reiations between the two countries" (Katsis, 1976:97-98).
Makarios' skillful opposition and the ensuing collapse of the weak
Stephanopoulos cabinet temporarily postponed the process, but the common
line between Athens and Nicosia was replaced by a schism regarding the
handling of the "national question". It fell upon the military regime to continue
and intensify the rift.

lliE GREEK MILITARY REGIME AND THE PROBLEM OF CYPRUS
Grivas' presence on the island created a dual authority. He criticized
Makarios for not wanting Enosis and attracted a small but vocal following to his
"pro Enosis" stand. Grivas welcomed the coup in Athens as a positive
dev•slopment which contrasted with Makarios' rather stoic attitude. Publicly the
new· rulers made bombastic pro-Enosis statements. Privately, however, they
pursued a different line. London's Daily Telegraph (July 1967) reported that
"the Greek military see two obstacles to their 'enotic' policy. One is the
nationalistic Cvpriot public opinion which opposes concessions, i.e., partition.
The other hindrance is President Makarios ....." The military rulers, the report
concluded, "characteristically leave the impression that they would not hesitate
to clash with him" (Gregoriadis, 197.5:1:134).
The kind of Enosis that the Colonels sought, however, was not one that
could have come about as a result of self-determination, as Makarios argued,
but an Enosis hammered out by the governments of Greece and Turkey. In
short, the military regime's Cypriiot policy differed very little from that of
Steph;:mopoulos' apostate government. Evidence of this surfaced almost
immediately. The Foreign Ministers of ;all NATO members urged Greece and
Turkey "J:o resume their discussions" and the two governments agreed to meet
on September 6, 1967 to discuss the Cyprus dispute. In an effort to consolidate
the home front, the Colonels sought to deal with the Cyprus problem quickly by
meeting Turkish officials on .the banks of Evros River. In returnfor Enosis, the
Greel-.;s offered concessions 11vhich the Turkish side rejected as insufficient, but
the two sides p)edged .to continue their dialogue.
The failure of this effortforced the Colonels to continue making pro-Enosis
statements for domestic consumption. This led to an intensification of Grivas'
criticism against Makarios and at the same: time angered the Turkish Cypriot
community. Thus on November 15, 1967 fighting broke out. The National
Guarct under the cc1mmand of Gel}eral Grivas moved in and smashed the
Tur1dsh-Cypriot fighters . .Ankara react~d sharply to these developments and
through President General Sunay stated that "we decided to solve the Cyprus
problem one•~ and for all" (l;{.atsis, 1976:122).
·yt:lrkey's threat of military action alairmed ,Johnson, who quickly dispatched
Unde11secretary of Defl?nse Cyru.s Vance to the area to defuse the crisis. Under
Wasbingtfm's pressure and f,earing an internal upheaval, the Colonels accepted
Vance's recommendaJiobs 1.vhich indud~d withdrawal of all Greek forces
clandestinely stationed on the island, dissolution of the Cypriot National
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Guard-largely run by officers from mainland Greece, expansion of the size
and scope of the U.N. peace-keeping contingent, and compensation by Greece
to all Turkish Cypriots who had suffered losses as a result of the fighting. In
addition, the Greek Government voluntarily recalled General Grivas, who had
become an embarrassment. Archbishop Makarios, however, refused to accede
to the dismantlement of the National Guard and to transfer police responsibility
to UNFICYP troops. After extensive manuevering in the U.N., the Turkish
government finally agreed to modify its position regarding these two key issues.
By the end of 1967 the Greek forces were out and the two communities had
agreed to engage in intercommunal talks under the auspices of the U.N. aimed
at solving the problem from within.
However, the intercommunal talks led nowhere and the blame for this
failure in Athens, Ankara, and Washington was put on Makarios' intransigence.
As early as the summer of 1971 the State Department had concluded that "the
problem Makarios" had to be neutralized and the task "was to be essentially left
to Greece" (Coufoudakis, 1976:290). This is not to say that agreement had been
reached on the method of implementation. Nonetheless, the Greek military
rulers pursued a relentless campaign that culminated in the overthrow of the
Archbishop in July 1974. Let us examine the events that unfolded during this
four-year period.
On February 21, 1970, the Soviet News Agency Tass, reported the
existence of "a subversive plan led by reactionary Cypriot and NATO
elements" designed to install in Cyprus "a terrorist military dictatorship of the
Greek model," and charged responsibility for the plot to the "reactionary Greek
officers who continue to occupy significant position in the Cypriot National
Guard" (Katsis, 1976: 135). Within a few weeks, the Soviet news agency's report
came true. On March 8, an unsuccessful assassination attempt against
Makarios took place. As it turned out, the plot was designed to create a climate
conducive to a military coup. Shortly before the assassination attempt, Der
Spiegel reported that the Cypriot government was in possession of a document
indicating that "the plot to overthrow Makarios' government had been laid out
in Athens" (Gregoriadis, 1975 11:121). At first, the Cypriot gov¢rnment denied
the authenticity of the document, but later on Makarios linked Greek officers to
the conspiracy (~Gregoriadis, 1975 11:124-125).
The struggle between Athens and Nicosia undoubtedly strengthened the
Turkish position but at the same time caused considerable nervousness in
Ankara. Turkey always wanted a negotiated settlement and certainly did not
view this quarrel as harmful to Turkish and Turkish Cypriot interests. Even
though Ankara had very little liking for Makarios and would have been more
than pleased to see him disappear from the scene, the Turks regarded with
suspicion any moves by the Greek officers to bring about his violent overthrow
and replace him with a pro-Enosis regime. Seemingly, Turkey wanted to avoid a
military confrontation with Greece that could have been precipitated in the
event that a pro·Enosis Cypriot government actively sought union with Greece.
However, Ankara was also concerned about gaining the support of the
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international community. Having endorsed the U.N.'s proposal for an
intercommunal agrrangement. as well as Washington's suggestion for a
negotiated settlement, Turkey sought to appear in the eyes of the international
community as a defender of recognized treaties and agreements. Thus, if
Ankara was forced to intervene in the event of a pro-Enosis take-over in
Cyprus, Turkey would have acted in accordance with the Treaties of Zurich and
London which essentially gave the right to the three guarantors to act together
or individually, if common effort was impossible, to take action with the purpose
of reestablishing the state of affairs created by the treaty.
In May 1971 Papadopoulos sought to pacify Turkish concerns. In an
interview with the Turkish daily Millet he stated that the Cypriot problem must
be worked out between Greece and Turkey, that "it should be made clear to the
two Cypriot communities" that Greece and Turkey are not willing to disturb
their relations, let alone fight, for their sake...", and that "if Cypriots are
convinced that we are determined to maintain good relations, then they will
come together and will try to reconcile their differe,nces (Papadopoulos, 1968
1972: VI:92-95).
Papadopoulos' conciliatory gesture seemed to have reassured Ankara. The
Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, t.;tking advantage of NATO's Foreign
Ministers' conference, met in Lisbon on <July 3 and 4, 1971 and worked out an
understanding designed to serve as a bar$is for handling the Cyprus dispute
bilaterally. The Lisbon accord included the following three poii'lts among others:
(1) Greece accepted the London and Zurich Agreements as being in full force;
(2) the Cypriot problem would not be discussed in the U.N. or any other
international body, but only between Greece and Turkey; and (3) Greece
a.greed never to advance the matter of Enosis again. Nonetheless, Soviet and
C~,rpriot sources indicated that at the Lisbon NATO conference "a plan was
formulated which foresaw the termination of Cypriot independence and the
partition of the island" (Coufoudakis, 1976a:289).
Shortlv after the Lisbon meeting, the military rulers began applying
presSL\re Ol'l Makarios. ln mletter dated ,July 18, 1971,Papadopoulos warned the
Archbishop to go along ~.\lith the Greek government's suggestions; otherwise
the government "will find itself in the avvkward necessity to take those steps
dictated by the national interests... however bitter these measures may be"
(Kakaounakis, 1976:159-161). Within a day or two, the Foreign Ministry passed
a compJ,ementary but confidential note to Makarios emphasizing that ". . .
Athens, as the ethnikrm kentron (national centet), draws and plans both policy
directions and tactics," and bluntly conclud~~d that"... the Cypriot line need be
within and adapt to the national guideline$'' (Kakaounakis, 1976:165-16'7). In
eff,ect,. the military regime let the Arch!Ji1SJhop know that Greece did not
recognize th1~ existence of Cy~rus as an independent entity with the right to
determine its own foreign policy, a ploy vJhichdear!y contradicted one of the
fundamental. points of the public Lisbon Lm:derstanding, lending weight to the
Soviet a1nd Cypj·iot charrg~~s that the unofficial af:J:r'eernent at Lisbon was the
opposite of the published version. Or, to be more explicit, the Greeks had been
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given the go-ahead to proceed as if double-Enosis had in fact taken place in
terms of foreign policy decision making between the Greek government and
Makarios.
The independent -minded Archbishop would not be trapped. Responding to
the argument that the Cypriot policy must be in conformity with that of the
national center, Makarios stated: "I do not accept such a view, particularly
when the Greek government repeatedly has emphasized its inability to
undertake the military protection of Cyprus." Under the circumstances, the
Archbishop concluded, "The Greek Cypriots must have the final word in
anything that concerns their survival and national future" (Kakaounakis, 1976:
II: 162-165).
Makarios' refusal to yield to the military rulers' ultimatum angered the
Colonels and galvanized their determination to dispense with him. For this
purpose the regime secretly dispatched General Grivas to the island to prepare
the ground. This time Grivas' presence on the island caused "no anxiety" to the
Turkish side (Katisis, 1976:154), but it was to irritate and undermine Makarios'
rule and policies. Grivas, acting as a surrogate of the Athens regime, formed a
terrorist organization which for sentimental reasons was named EOKA-B and
whose alleged goal was to bring about Enosis. EOKA-B and other similar gangs
that mushroomed on the island engaged in sabotage activities against the
government. Athens offered its semi-official blessings to these groups stating
that there was nothing illegal about them.
By the following February the Athens government and its surrogates in
Cyprus, led by the Greek-ledNational Guard, appeared ready to stage a coup.
The Cypriot government, however, got wind of the subversive plan and moved
expeditiously to foil the plot. President Makarios informed the American
ambassador that the Cypriots would resist the coup and that diplomatic
representatives of other countries woul<;l also be informed. Fearing that a move
against Makarios would embarrass the U.S. and perhaps endanger detente, the
American ambassdor urged his superiors to dissuade the Colonels' intentions.
Within a day this initiative bore fruit and the U.S., through Ambassador Tasca,
"warned" Papadopoulos "against the use of violence or heavy stuff" (de
Borchgrave, 1974:2). It appears therefore that American policymakers
deplored the use of violence but condoned the "peaceful" removal of Makarios.
Adhering to Washington's insistence against the use of "heavy stuff," the
praetorian government temporarily shelved its coupist plans but not its
sabotage efforts. At the same time the regime unleashed a diplomatic offensive
to force Makarios' resignation. On February 2,5, 1972, Deputy Foreign Minister
Panagiotakos delivered a memorandum to Ankara's envoy in Athens criticizing
Makarios as an "unstable character" and a "liar," and concluded, that
"cooperation between Athens and Nicosia is not possible as long as Makarios
remains president of the Cypriot Republic" (Katsis, 1976:appendix). In essence,
tJ-le Greek government formally sought Turkey's assistance to remove the
Archbishop from power. Turkish authorities seemed prepared to cooperate.
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Prime Minister Nihat Erim stated that "Greece and Turkey wish to arrange this
problem (meaning Cyprus) ... (but) Makarios is capable enought to create
difficulties for the two countries" (Katsis 1976:194-196). London's Daily
Telegraph, on March 28, 1972, evaluated the emerging common front against
Makarios saying that "Greece and Turkey have decided that peace in Cyprus
can be possible only when Makarios has left rhe scene... " and added, "there are
not indications that America and Britain have come to a similar conclusion ..."
1(Katsis, 1976: 195-196).
Thus, a new offensive against the Archbishop got underway and took the
form of pressure from within. Calls for his resignation came from the leadership
of the autocephalous Orthodox Church of Cyprus. Following the
recommendation of the Greek government, three bishops delivered an
ultimaturn to Makarios demanding his resignation as president on the grounds
that under church law an Archbishop should not hold temporal power.
Makarios refused to comply and the bishops proceeded to defrock him. With
popular support behind him he went on the offensive. He invited the Supreme
Synod, consisting of Orthodox Patriarchs, to judge whether he had violated
canon law. The Synod met in June 1973, cleared Makarios, and moved to
condemn and defrock his three antagonists (Markides, 1977:108-112). Through
the use of shrewd political maneuverings Makarios survived another crisis
emanating from within the most powedul social force in Cyprus, the Orthodox
church. The failure of these efforts to unseat the Archbishop prompted the
Athens regime to re-employ violence. But "Plan Apollo," as the latest plot
became known, was never carried out because the Cypriot intelligence
uncovered the plot in August 1973, and foiled it before it had a chance to
blossom.
With the failure of Apollo time ran out on Papadopoulos. In November
1973, the hardliners led by security chief Ioannidis, toJ)pled Papadopoulos for,
as they put it, he had "failed to realize the goals of the April21, 1967 Revolution ..
." i(Gregoriadis, 1975:IU:l31). Having said that, however, the military tacitly
admitted the failure of their regime. Within a few weeks it became apparent that
the new gO\:,ernment had nothing new to offer and lacked any sense of direciton
and vii:alit!/· As economic and political problems worsened, so did the
government's ability to cope with them. Only a national crisis could have saved
the ne1;v regime. Shortly after Joannidis' ascent to power Grivas di·ed, and his
death gave the new strongman far greater control over the activities of EOKA
B. In f,abruary, supported by Athens, EOKAB set in motion an alii-out effort
against the Archbishop.
Howev<er, the discovery of oil deposits in the Aegean reactivated the Greco
Turkish Copflict. This ;:liong witp ioannidis' apparent failure to reassure Turkish
authorities further exacerbated Ankara's .anxieties. At the same time, Cyprus
present.ed an opportupit)l to the weak coa!lition government of Bulent Ecevit to
strengthen its political standing. One or perhaps a combination of the following
consideratipn.s seem to have shaped the thinking of the Greek military rulers in
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their decision to stage a coup against the Cypriot leader: removing Makarios
from the scene would not meet with American opposition; Makarios' removal
would pave the way for double-Enosis which would have been sold domestically
as Enosis with minor adjustments; Turkey would accept anyone as Makarios'
replacement; Ioannidis and his colleagues had become contemptuous of the
Cypriots higher standard of living and lifestyle and detested the legal status that
the Communist Party (AKEL) enjoyed; finally, like their civilian counterparts,
they believed that the Cypriots must follow the decisions of the ethnikon
kentron regarding the handling of the national question.
The Archbishop and his associates sensed that a new coup was in the offing
and once again sought to neutralize it. Cyprus' envoy to Washington was
instructed to ask American officials to exert pressure on the military rulers to
change their plans. Ambassador Dimitriou called on the State Department and
reportedly stated "that a serious effo_rt will be made to assassinate Archbishop
Makarios..."(Stern, 1977:94). Despite the flurry of diplomatic cables indicating
that a military coup was imminent, "Foggy Bottom" adhered to Kissinger's
instructions to avoid meddling in the internal policies of the Athens regime and
to give primacy to the national security relationship between Washington and
Athens (U.S. Intelligence, 1975).
Washington's latest attitude did not seem to reflect a change of heart.
Makarios was still considered the stumbling block toward solving the Cyprus
dispute within the framework of the Western Alliance. United States
policymakers wished to see the Archbishop removed but, as previously,
opposed his removal by force. The failure of the State Department, to dissuade
Joannidis against the use of "heavy stuff," as the United States had done before,
stems from what appeared to have been an intelligence failure. In fact, it was
said that the latest report that the State Department received hours before the
coup indicated that "Joannidis ... impressed by the arguments against violence .
. . was cooling off on his coup intentions ..."(Stern, 1975:55). In the light of these
murky conditions, the State Department downplayed Ambassador
Dimitrious's warnings as unconfirmed rumors-a position echoed by Secretary
Kissinger's statement shortly after the coup that "the information was not
exactly lying around on the. streets" (Stern, 1975:55).
Despite the general calmness about Cyprus in the State Department, there
was a dissenting voice, that of Q;rprus Country Director Thomas Boyatt, who
repeatedljj warned his superiors of an imminent move against Makarios (Stern,
1975:46-50). The higher echelons of the State Department initially ignored
Boyatt'sreport but eventually im;tructed Ambassador Tasca to warn the Greek
government against the use of violence. Tasca contacted Prime Minister
Androutsopoulos and expressed U.S. disapproval of violence. But the
American ambassador refused to see Brigadier General Joannidis, the real
holder of power, whom he dismissed as "a cop" that "you do not make
diplomatic demarches to" (de Borchgrave, 1974:34). But while Tasca was being
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reassured by the "official" Greek government that there was nothing in the
offing, the de facto ruler, General Ioannidis, held repeated meetings with CIA
officials who apparently led him to believe that Washington would approve of his
plans to move against Makarios (Stern, 1976). Ioannidis' statement months
after the July coup that "if you knew what I knew you would have done the same
thing" provides evidence suggesting that the State Department and the CIA
pursued contradictory policies regarding the Cyprus issue.
Sensing that diplomatic efforts were producing no results, Makarios
decided to abandon his wait-and-see tactics and went on the offensive. On July
2, 1974, he sent a non-confidential letter to Greek President General Gizikis
openly charging that '"members of the military regime of Greece support and
direct the terrorist activities of EOKA-B and the involvement of Greek officers
of lthe National Guard in unlawful acts of conspiracy and other inadmissible
conducts." Heminding the Greek. rulers that he was not its "appointed
perfect ... but the elected leader," Makarios demanded the immediate "recall of
all Greek officers serving in the National Guard..." (Gregoriadis, 1975: III:l69
173). The Archbishop's lett,er did not change Ioannidis' intentions. The muzzled
mass media in Greece mentioned nothing about MiJ.karios' letter. Instead, the
government unleashed an angry anti-Makarios campaign. The stage was now
set. On July 15, 1974, the National G~ard moved against the presidential palace.
Makarios was overthrovm but not physically eliminated as the miliitary rulers
had hoped. Nonetheless, a pro-Enosi.s terrorist, Nicos Sampson, was sworn in
as President of Cyprus.
The military government of Athens moved quickly to deny any involvement
stn"ssing that the coup in Cyprus was an internal affair of the Cypriot republic.
But the Turkish government and the Turkish-Cypriots would not have any of
that and reacted sharply to the news of the coup. Prime Minister Ecevit of
Turkey characterized the overthrow of Mak.arios as a violation of the "Treaty of
Guarantee" and on J·uly 19 stressed that "the crisis is of large dimensions and
Turkey's patience is small" (New York Times, 1974). Turkey's long awaited
opportunity bad finally come. Brushing a1.vav Assistant Secretary of State
Joseph Sisco's plea to exercise restraint and using: the Treaty of Guarantee as
legal justification, Turkey invaded the island by force.
Turkey's invasion prompted the "uniformed and incompetent" Ioannidis
and his equaUy impotent "civilian ministers," as Ambassador Tasca described
them (de Borchgrave, 1974:34), to order g,eneral mobilization and prepared to
declqre war against the perennial enemy to the east. The declaration of a
national emergency, however, aut~::m1.atically brought about the reinstatement
of hierarchical command in the military. Th,e hitherto docile. commanders of the
three services (army, air force, navy), ;:~nd th.e Chief ofthe Armed Forces, were
suddenly faced with either making decisions or implementing those made by
their subordinate, i.e,, Brigqdier Ioanniai$. In their July 22 meeting the three
commmanders inforrned. the Chief of the Armed Forces that their respective
services were not prepared for 1.-var.. Then the four generals proceeded to
remove Ioannidis and to call back the old politicaUeaders to "save" the country.
Following intensive deliberation, former Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis
was invited from his self-imposed exile. to form a civilian. government. Makarios
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survived the coup and eventually returned to power and the military returned to
the barracks, thus terminating almost seven years of praetorian rule.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY REGIME'S CYPRUS POLICY
On the surface, the Cypriot policy of the apostates government and that of
the military regime seem to have one thing in common: both appeared prepared
to solve the "national question" through bilateral negotiations with Turkey-a
strategy that Markarios consistently rejected. A closer look, however, reveals
that while the Stephanopoulos cabinet indicated willingness to accept a
compromise solution involving the exchange of territories without necessarily
carving up the island, the praetorian regime, despite its bombastic pro-Enosis
public pronouncements, seemed determined to proceed with a solution that
would have culminated in double Enosis i.e., partition. The pro-junta Salonika
daily, Ellinikos Vorras, most tactfully expressed the military rulers' thinking
regarding the Cyprus problem: "Because we are realists," the editorial
contended, "since no other more favorable solution is possible, our first and last
concession is double Enosis with 80 percent of Cyprus to Greece and 20
percent to Turkey." And the author rhetorically concluded: "Why was the kind
of solution possible in Thrace and not in Cyprus?" (Katsis, 1976:160). Double
Enosis in effect, had been the praetorians' Cypriot policy. But why were the
military rulers of Greece, known for their nationalism, pursuing a policy that
went contrary to the very thrust of the "Megali ldea"?3 The answer to this
question can be sought by examining the reasons underlying America's, and by
implication NATO's, posture regarding Cyprus and by exploring the Greek
military's relationship with and attitud~s toward the U.S. and the North Atlantic
Alliance.
The recovery of vast oil deposits in the Fertile Crescent coupled with the
rise of nationalism in the area and the establishment of Israel propelled the
Middle East to the forefront of the rivalry between the forces of communism and
democracy. The 1956 Suez crisis and the ensuing cooling-off in the relations
between the U.S. and Egypt (largely as a result of Secretary Dulles' refusal to
commit American assistance in the building of the As wan Dam), as well as leftist
inspired coups in Iraq and Syria increased the strategic importance of Cyprus.
The once commercial refueling station became an important observation point
paramount to the strategic interests of the U.S. and the North Atlantic
community. At no other time did America desire more to "keep the Soviet
Union . . . from gaini~ some foothold in Cyprus as an ally of Archbishop
Makarios or through the Cypriot Communist Party (AKEL) which generally
supported Makarios" than in the years following the Six Day War of July 1967
(Campbell, 1976:14). The increasingly viable presence of the Soviet fleet in the
Mediterranean and the expansion of Russian influence in the Middle East
coupled with the rise of power of Middof in Malta, and the loss of home-porting
galvanized American and NATO determination to bring the Cyprus dispute to a
close (Coufoudakis, 1976a:287). It was within this context that American policy
3 Megali Idea (Great Idea) referred to a policy designed for the redemption of the former
Byzantine territories and the establishment of a greater Greece.
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makers, from President Johnson on, applied increasing pressure on Greece
and Turkey to solve the Cyprus question on the basis of bilateral negotiations
guided by the famous/infamous Acheson Plan.
The "Castro of the Mediterranean," as Makarios was referred to in high
policy circles in Washington, had repeatedly frustrated American aims to have
the Cyprus problem solved within NATO. Consequently, the Cypriot leader
was seen as too unreliable for American tastes and harmful to the Atlantic
Alliance's strategic goals. At the same time, the continuing existence of the
Cyprus issue had become an irritant in the relations between Greece and
Turkey (both members of NATO's southern flank) and was seen in Washington
as "a bleeding ulcer" that had to be eradicated (Campbell, 1976:15). The
thoroughly anti-communist Greek military shared Washington's apprehensions
toward Makarios' neutralist stands and fully subscribed to the North Atlantic
community's fear of Soviet infiltration and eventual domination of the
Mediterranean basin and the oil-rich Middle East. It is also reasonable to assume
that the Greek military believed that 1..1Jithout American and NATO support the
goal of keeping the Soviets out of the area could not be accomplished. Thus, as
a result of ideological congruencies reinforce:d by professional responsibilities to
protect their client-the Greek state-the Greek military maintained a close, if
not a cordial relationship with the U.S. and the North Atlantic Alliance since
1951 when Greece joined NATO.
This close relationship was based not on common ideological grounds
alone, but on substa.ntive actions as \Mel!. As table 1 indicates, NATO countries
and particularly the U.S. became Greece's alm~lst exclusive arms suppliers.
Moreover, the Americans through the Truman Doctrine rushed to provide
assistance to t!-1~ Greek military in their battle against the communist insurgents
during the critical stag1~s of the Greek Civil War (1946-1949). Such aid
continued to flow in during the ensuing ~H::Jars as part of American economic and
militatv aid programs authorized by the U.S. Con:gress in the 1950's and 1960's.
For a country the .size of Greece, American aid amounted to a respectable
Table 1

GREECE'S ARMS SUPPLIES
SUPPLIER
Year
1964-73
19?4-78

SOURCE:

Total

Valu~a

~-

Franc~

94,1

792

42

1,700

1,100

380

U.K.

G.F.R.

Italy

Canada

Otherb

20

98
110

so

10

30

9

World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, u.s. Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency, Washington, D.C., 1963-1973 and 1969-1978.
a--millions of U.S. Dollars
b--not including Warsaw Pact Nations
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portion of the defense budget, thus providing in:!petus to the argument that the
Hellenic Armed Forces had become a "penetrated" institution.
In addition to monetary aid the Greek military benefited professionally by
participation in common NATO exercises and postgraduate training in
western-mainly American-military schools. During the years from 1950 to
1969, it is estimated that 11,229 officers of the Hellenic Armed Forces received
postgraduate training "in the dogmatically anti-communist" corps, which
approximated 11,000 men, the ratio "assume(d) considerable significance"
(Couloumbis, 1976:126). Additional evidence further illustrates the close
relationship between the Greek military and the North Atlantic alliance. For
example, it was estimated that in 1971 77 percent of the navy officers, followed
by 43 percent of the air force and 34 percent of the army, possessed proficiency
in one or more foreign-mainly western-languages with English by far the
most widely spoken (Kourvetaris, 1976:135).
This close relationship is said to have been one of the causes of the 1967
intervention. Upon assuming power, the Greek military announced that they
did so in order to forestall a communist takeover which, among other things,
would have disrupted Greece's links with NATO-an agreement supported by
a small but vocal number of academics (Kousoulas, 1969). Papadopoulos lost
no time in stressing the importance of the North Atlantic Alliance committed to
"the preservation of peace and the defense of the strides of the western
civilization which are constantly threatened by totalitarianism" (Papadopoulos,
1968:III:77).
The results of my survey questionnaire lend additional supportive evidence
regarding the attitudes of the Greek military toward NATO and the U.S. In very
high percentage the responding officers indicated that NATO has been
beneficial to world peace and that Greece's membership in it has kept the
country out of communist danger. An equally high number of the officers felt
that Greece could not have defended herself without NATO, and regarded the
country's continuous participation in it as vital to its present and future security
interests. Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of the respondents (evenly
distributed across the three services) indicated that Greece's membership in
the North Atlantic Alliance has been very valuable to their professional
interests, as has the postgraduate training they received in the Naval
Postgraduate School which almost unanimously they regard as superior to its
counterparts in their homeland. Almost all of the responding officers agree that
Greece's membership in NATO has improved the training and general
capabilities of the Hellenic Armed Forces, and at the same time they recognized
the need for the U.S. as the leading non-communist power to play a prominent
role in formulating and implementing the organization's strategies. The same
officers view American participation in NATO as almost indispensable. With
respect to the relationship between the foreign policy objectives of countries
belonging to defense alliances of the NATO type, two-thirds of the respondents
expressed the opinion that member-states should adopt foreign policies that are
in basic agreement with the fundamental goals and intentions of the
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organizcLtion, even if they are not in complete harmony with the national
aspirations of the member-state. Finally, without exception the respondents felt
that Greece had been a very faithful partner in the North Atlantic defense
community.
The overwhelmingly positive attitudes of the Greek military regarding
NATO and the U.S. contrast sharply with anti-American and anti-NATO
sentiments prevalent in the Greek press during the years following the 1974
Cyprus crisis. For example, Carmocolias found the attitude of the Athens press
toward the U.S. and NATO to be "critical." This uniform stance, he observes,
"is especially noteworth~~ in a press system where dailies (newspapers) often
adopt diametrically opposed views and provide fundamentally different
interpretations to public affairs depending on political party affiliation"
(1981:229).
The preceding analysis provides evidence suggesting th<.tt the U.S. sought
an ;;mang(~ment of the Cyprus dispute within NATO, fearing that any other
solution outside the North Atlantic framework would compromise the strategic
interests of the West. The data also demonstrates a very close relationship
between the Greek military and the NATO defense community exemplified by
the very postive attitudes on the part of the Greek officers toward both the U.S.
and NATO. On the basis of these, then, one can argue that the Greek militar~l
due to professional needs such as arms, training, and general support-became
highly dependent on the United States and the North Atlantic Alliance and
actively pursued a U.S.-NATO desired solution to the Cyprus problem even
though such a posture seemed to compromise the national aspirations of the
GrE~ek state whose interests the military swore to defend.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this paper h;:;Ls been to examine the impact of alliance oriented
professionalism on the behavior of the military of member states of defense
alliances. This paper looked at the Cyprus questiot:l and its handling by the
Greek praetorian regime that culminated in the debacle of July 1974, as a result
of which Turkish military forces occupied a significant portion of the island.
It appears that the North Atlantic community and its leading member the
U.S. sought to solve the Cypriot dispute within the confines of the alliance.
American and NATO policy makers ex,erted considerable pressure on the
predominantly civilian Greek cabinets (from the early 1950's to 1966) to accept
a NATO sponsored solution to the problem. The data revealed that on the
whole, albeit eager to compromise and at least partially accept Western
proposals designed to solve the Cyprus question within NATO, these civilian
cabinets consistently rejected advances involving partition of the island in
Greek and Turkish sectors-an approach long advocated by Turkey. The
praetorian regime on the other hand was prepared to accept such a solution
and, in fact, actively pursued a policy designed to b!'ing about double Enosis
while making bombastic public statements for Enosis.
What appeared to be a contradiction betvveen the private and public aims of
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the Greek military rulers in fact seemed to have been an unconscious but
nonetheless classic case of confusion between the interests of their client, the
Greek state, and those of the North Atlantic alliance. In pursuing a long held
NATO goal to solve the Cyprus problem through a bilateral agreement between
Greece and Turkey, the Colonels apparently had come to believe that such a
solution would have meant the union of a part of Cyprus with mother Greece.
They felt this would have satisfied the objectives of Greece and the Greek
Cypriots. In short, the Greek military saw no distinction between Enosis and
partition and viewed Makarios' opposition to such plans as an anti-enotic
obstacle that had to be liquidated.
This apparent confusion cannot be said to have been the result of
accidental misinterpretations of aims and events surrounding the Cyprus
quagmire. Instead, as the foregoing analysis indicates, it is the result of the
regime's handling of the close relationship between the Greek military and the
North Atlantic alliance. Faced with a real or perceived communist threat the
Greek military saw in NATO the only party willing and able to provide them with
the necessary assistance and support to accomplish their professional mission.
As the date reveals, the Greek military perceived the existence of NATO as
paramount and identified the survival of their client, the Greek state, (and by
implication their own organization) with the goals and well being of the North
Atlantic alliance. Since Western policy makers perceived that a solution of the
Cyprus problem within NATO would eradicate the organization's bleeding
ulcer, the Greek military rulers appeared prepared to assist them to bring such
a solution about seemingly believing that this would also be in the best interests
of their profession and their country.
.
In sum, the findings of this paper support the position that aspects of
professionalism lead the military to confuse the interests of defense alliances to
which they belong with the national interests of their own country. Recent
developments in Poland where the military of that nation adhering to the
U.S.S.R. -Warsaw Pact line moved to crush the Solidarity movement also
appear to substantiate this thesis.
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